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Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
George Berkeley
1713
Copyright 1996, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for
details on copyright and editing conventions. This text file is
based on the 1910 Harvard Classics edition of Berkeley's . Pagenation follows T.E. Jessop's 1949 edition of
, in , Vol. 2.
This is a working draft; please report errors.[1]
* * * *
THREE DIALOGUES
Between
HYLAS AND PHILONOUS
The Design of which is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and
Perfection of
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
The Incorporeal Nature of the
SOUL
And the Immediate Providence of a
DEITY
In Opposition to
SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS
Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy,
Useful, and Compendious
{171}
THE FIRST DIALOGUE
. Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find
you abroad so early.
. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts
were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night,
that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a
turn in the garden.
. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and
agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a
pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the
year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the
fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence
of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of
nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too
being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those
meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of
the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt
your thoughts: for you seemed very intent on something.
. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you
will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any
means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow
more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am alone:
but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my
reflexions to you.
. With all my heart, it is what I should have
requested myself if you had not prevented me.
. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have
in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from
the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended
either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most
extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if
their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some
consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief
lieth {172} here; that when men of less leisure see them who are
supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of
knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or
advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly
received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions
concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto
held sacred and unquestionable.
. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of
the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical
conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of
thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I
had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you
on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the
plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my
understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily
comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and
riddle.
. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
heard of you.
. Pray, what were those?
. You were represented, in last night's conversation,
as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing
as in the world.
. That there is no such thing as what , I am seriously persuaded: but, if I
were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should
then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have
now to reject the contrary opinion.
. What I can anything be more fantastical, more
repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of
Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as ?
. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that
you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common
Sense, than I who believe no such thing?
. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than
the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I
should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.
. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for
true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to
Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism?
. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes
{173} about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once
to hear what you have to say.
. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a ?
. I mean what all men mean -- one that doubts of
everything.
. He then who entertains no doubts concerning some
particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a
sceptic.
. I agree with you.
. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the
affirmative or negative side of a question?
. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot
but know that signifies a suspense between both.
. He then that denies any point, can no more be said
to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of
assurance.
. True.
. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to
be esteemed a sceptic than the other.
. I acknowledge it.
. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you
pronounce me , because I deny what you affirm, to wit,
the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as
peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.
. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my
definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not
to be insisted on. I said indeed that a was one who
doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the
reality and truth of things.
. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems
of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual
notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial
therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.
. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think
you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of
sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not
this sufficient to denominate a man a ?
. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that
denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest
ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be
{174} esteemed the greatest ?
. That is what I desire.
. What mean you by Sensible Things?
. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can
you imagine that I mean anything else?
. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to
apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry.
Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things
only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or,
may those things properly be said to be which are
perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?
. I do not sufficiently understand you.
. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are
the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested
to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the
letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there
is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things
suggested by them to be so too.
. No, certainly: it were absurd to think or
sensible things; though they may be signified and
suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an
arbitrary connexion.
. It seems then, that by you mean
those only which can be perceived by sense?
. Right.
. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one
part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth
thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that
diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a
sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?
. It doth.
. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet
I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?
. You cannot.
. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot
and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel
the cause of its heat or weight?
. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell
you once for all, that by I mean those only
which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses
perceive nothing which they do not perceive : for
they make no {175} inferences. The deducing therefore of causes
or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are
perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.
. This point then is agreed between us -- That
. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately
perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and
figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate,
anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the
touch, more than tangible qualities.
. We do not.
. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all
sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?
. I grant it.
. Sensible things therefore are {250} nothing else but
so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible
qualities?
. Nothing else.
. then is a sensible thing?
. Certainly.
. Doth the of sensible things consist in
being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being
perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?
. To is one thing, and to be is
another.
. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of
these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being
perceived?
. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and
without any relation to, their being perceived.
. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must
exist without the mind?
. It must.
. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there
any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to
others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.
. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.
. What! the greatest as well as the least?
. tell you, the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and
consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree.
. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of
heat a very great pain?
. No one can deny it.
. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure?
. No, certainly.
. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a
being endowed with sense and perception?
. It is senseless without doubt.
. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?
. By no means.
. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by
sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?
. I grant it.
. What shall we say then of your external object; is
it a material Substance, or no?
. It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it.
. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own
it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this
point.
. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense
heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something
distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.
. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct
sensations?
. But one simple sensation.
. Is not the heat immediately perceived?,
. It is.
. And the pain?
. True.
. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is
both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and,
consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is
nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.
. It seems so.
. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can
conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.
{177}
. I cannot.
. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible
pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular
idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.
. I do not find that I can.
. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is
nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense
degree?
. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to
suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving
it.
. What! are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense, between affirming and denying?
. I think I may be positive in the point. A very
violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.
. It hath not therefore according to you, any
being?
. I own it.
. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in
nature really hot?
. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I
only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.
. But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat
were equally real; or, if there was any difference, that the
greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser?
. True: but it was because I did not then consider the
ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now
plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else
but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist
but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can
really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is
no reason wh' we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist
in such a substance.
. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of
heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without
it?
. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain
cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is
a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of
heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.
. I think you granted before that no unperceiving
being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.
. I did. {178}
. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat
than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?
. What then?
. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an
unperceiving substance, or body.
. So it seems.
. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that
are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking
substance; may we not conclude that external bodies are
absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever?
. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that
warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.
. do not pretend that warmth is as great a
pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a
small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.
. I could rather call it an . It seems to be
nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that
such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking
substance, I hope you will not deny.
. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a
gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince
you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think
you of cold?
. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold
is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great
uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a
lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.
. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to
our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded
to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those,
upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be
thought to have cold in them.
. They must.
. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a
man into an absurdity?
. Without doubt it cannot.
. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing
should be at the same time both cold and warm?
. It is.
. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other
cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of
{179} water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem
cold to one hand, and warm to the other?
. It will.
. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to
conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that
is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity?
. I confess it seems so.
. Consequently, the principles themselves are false,
since you have granted that no true principle leads to an
absurdity.
. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to
say, ?
. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in
two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?
.. We ought.
. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and
divide the fibres of your flesh?
. It doth.
. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?
. It doth not.
. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation
itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the
pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted,
judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it,
to be in the fire.
. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this
point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations
existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to
secure the reality of external things.
. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear
that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible
qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without
the mind, than heat and cold?
. Then indeed you will have done something to the
purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.
. Let us examine them in order. What think you of
, do they exist without the mind, or no?
. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is
sweet, or wormwood bitter?
. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind
of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not? {180}
. It is.
. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or
pain?
. I grant it.
. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking
corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness
and bitterness, that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?
. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time.
You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular
sorts of pleasure and pain; to which simply, that they were.
Whereas I should have thus distinguished: those qualities, as
perceived by us, are pleasures or pair existing in the external
objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is
no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that
heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or
sugar. What say you to this?
. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse
proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you
defined to be, . Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as
distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at
all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to
have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and
assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But
what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a
loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that
heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities
which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the
mind?
. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up
the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it
sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.
. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along
with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a
distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer
than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same
food; since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And
how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in
the food?
. I acknowledge I know not how.
. In the next place, are to be considered.
And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath
{181} been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are
they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?
. They are.
. Can you then conceive it possible that they should
exist in an unperceiving thing?
. I cannot.
. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect
those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the
same smells which we perceive in them?
. By no means.
. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the
other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but
a perceiving substance or mind?
. I think so.
. Then as to , what must we think of them: are
they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?
. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain
from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an
air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be
thought the subject of sound.
. What reason is there for that, Hylas?
. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we
perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's
motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any
sound at all.
. And granting that we never hear a sound but when
some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can
infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.
. It is this very motion in the external air that
produces in the mind the sensation of . For, striking on
the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the
auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is
thereupon affected with the sensation called .
. What! is sound then a sensation?
. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular
sensation in the mind.
. And can any sensation exist without the mind?
. No, certainly.
. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the
air, if by the you mean a senseless substance existing
without the mind?
. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it
is {182} perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is
the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and
that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular
kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or
undulatory motion the air.
. I thought I had already obviated that distinction,
by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before.
But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is
really nothing but motion?
. I am.
. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with
truth be attributed to motion?
. It may.
. It is then good sense to speak of as of a
thing that is , , , .
. see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it
not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible
sound, or the common acceptation of the word, but not
to in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just
now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air?
. It seems then there are two sorts of sound -- the
one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and
real?
. Even so.
. And the latter consists in motion?
. I told you so before.
. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you,
the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?
. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.
. It should follow then, that, according to you, real
sounds may possibly be , but never .
. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a
jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things.
I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something
oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the
use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions
adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the
way.
. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself
to have gained no small point, since you make so light of
departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part
of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the {183}
common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the
world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical
paradox, to say that , and that the
idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there
nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?
. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the
concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too
have no real being without the mind.
. And I hope you will make no difficulty to
acknowledge the same of .
. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?
. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal
Substances existing without the mind?
. They are.
. And have true and real colours inhering in them?
. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in
it.
. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive
by sight?
. There is not.
. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do
not perceive immediately?
. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing?
I tell you, we do not.
. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more,
whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses,
except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but
I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same
opinion.
. I do.
. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality, or made up of sensible qualities?
. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?
. My reason for asking was, because in saying, , you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either
that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that
there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight:
but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still
maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your
is nothing distinct from . {184}
. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you
please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you
shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my
own meaning.
. I wish you would make me understand it too. But,
since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal
substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be
pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see
exist in external bodies, or some other.
. The very same.